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ON BEING A RELIGIOUS  PROFESSIONAL:  THE RELIGIOUS
TURN IN PROFESSIONAL ETHICS'
MARTHA  MINOWt
What divides Senator Joseph Lieberman and ChiefJustice  William
Rehnquist?  I  assume  many  things,  such  as  the  street  between  the
Capitol building and the Supreme  Court, but it strikes  me  as surpris-
ing that Democratic  and Jewish Senator  Lieberman  has argued  that
individuals'  religious  beliefs  and practices  should  guide  their profes-
sional  conduct  while  Republican  and  Lutheran  Rehnquist  has  dis-
agreed.  Attorney General John Ashcroft  may represent the  bridging
example:  he  certainly thought his religious  views should  animate his
role  as  a legislator,  but recently  indicated  that professional  duties at
the  Department  of Justice  would  require  him  to  enforce  laws  with
which he has had religious objections.
These are not simply isolated individuals.  The  growing attention
to what it means to be a Catholic lawyer, a Jewish judge, or a Christian
doctor occupies not only pages in academic journals but also bulletin
boards and panel discussions at professional  schools and, increasingly,
broad  public  debate.  (There  is  almost  nothing,  by  the  way,  about
Moslems, Hindus, or members of other religions, and my remarks, un-
fortunately, will do little to remedy this lack.)
Why  is  there a turn to religion now in discussions  of professional
conduct?  What  are  the  benefits  and  worries  that  this  turn  signals?
And  what paths  can  individuals  and  institutions  use  to  navigate  the
emerging debate over the place of religion in professional life?  These
are the questions that I will explore here.
" Delivered  as  the  Owen J.  Roberts  Memorial  Lecture,  University  of Pennsylvania
Law School, February 8, 2001.
t Professor, Harvard  Law  School.  Thanks  to Joe Singer, Robert  Singer, Peter Ad-
land, Bill Stuntz, Andrew Williams, and to the  University  of Pennsylvania  audience  for
conversations about this topic.
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I.  WHY Now?
It is not obvious what to use as a baseline, and I do not pretend to
offer  scientific  assessment, but even a casual observation  detects  surg-
ing interest in the specific  relevance  of particular religions  to profes-
sional  practices  and  the  general pertinence  of religion  to public  de-
bates.  Take  the  law  review  literature.  Attention  to  religion  and
professional  practice  always  occupied  specialized  religious  journals,
such  as  The Catholic Lawyer,' but  now mainstream journals are in  the
business.  When Thomas Shaffer and Robert Cover wrote in the early
1980s  connecting religion  and the  work  of lawyers,  theirs  were  rare
voices.  But  it  is  not  unusual  now  to  see  religious sources-ranging
from  the Talmud  to papal  teachings-cited  in  law  review  footnotes.4
I See Joseph  T. Tinnelly,  The  Catholic  Lawyer-An  Idea and a Program, 1  CATH.
LAW.  3, 4  (1955)  (announcing the  mission of the journal  as  "provid[ing]  reliable  in-
formation in  a wide  variety of legal subjects  of interest or importance  to  Catholics,  to
the Catholic  Church or to Catholic lawyers");  see also HenryJ. Hyde,  Contemporary Chal-
lenges to  Catholic  Lawyers, 38  CATH.  LAW.  75,  85-86  (1998)  (challenging  "Catholic law-
yers and public  advocates" to rely on their faith in order to repair the "damage done to
the moral foundations  of our  democracy"  through  recent  legislative and judicial  de-
velopments);  Symposium,  Lawyering and Personal Values, 38  CATH.  LAW.  145  (1998)
(presenting  debate  attempting  to  resolve  the  "current  ethical  crisis"  felt  by  lawyers
whose religious faith  conflicts with their professional obligations).
2  See,  e.g.,  Marie  A. Failinger,  The Justice Who  Wouldn't Be Lutheran:  Toward Borrow-
ing the Wisdom of  Faith Traditions,  46  CLEV. ST.  L.  REV.  643, 647  (1998)  (arguing that "a
judge's  religious  understandings  may  usefully inform  the  rhetorical  elements  of his
opinion");  Alex  Kozinski  &  Leslie A.  Hakala,  Keeping Secrets:  Religious Duty vs.  Profes-
sional Obligation,  38  WASHBURN  L.J.  747  (1999)  (examining whether professional  con-
fidentiality  obligations  impermissibly  burden  an  attorney's  exercise  of  religion);
Sanford Levinson,  The Confrontation  of Religious Faith  and Civil Religion:  Catholics Becom-
ingJustices,  39  DEPAUL L. REv.  1047,  1048  (1990)  (using the confirmation  hearings of
Catholic  nominees  to  the United States Supreme Court to  "examine some of the  im-
plications  of the subsuming of religious  identities  within the more  secular ...  culture
of American constitutionalism"); Russell G. Pearce,  The  Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEX.
TECH.  L.  REV.  1259  (1996)  (considering the effects ofJewish ethnic and religious iden-
tity on  the professional  attitudes and goals of Jewish lawyers);  Dennis Turner, Infusing
Ethical, Moral, and Religious Values into a Law School Curriculum, 24  U.  DAYTON  L.  REV.
283, 284-86  (1999)  (citing efforts by Yale  Law  School  professors to  incorporate  relig-
ious teachings into the curriculum).
3  THOMAS  L.  SHAFFER,  ON  BEING  A  CHRISTIAN  AND  A  LAWYER:  LAW  FOR  THE
INNOCENT  (1981);  Robert M.  Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,  97  HARV.  L. REV. 4
(1983),  reprinted in  NARRATIVE,  VIOLENCE,  AND  THE  LAW:  THE  ESSAYS  OF  ROBERT
COVER 95  (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
4  See,  e.g.,  Paula Abrams,  The  Tradition of Reproduction, 37  ARIZ.  L.  REV.  453,  457
n.24  (1995)  (TALMUD,  Yebamoth 63b);  George  P.  Fletcher,  Three Nearly Sacred Books in
Western Law, 54  ARK.  L.  REV.  1,  8 n.23  (2001)  (TALMUD,  Baba Mezi'a 59b); Jonathan
Granoff, Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals, and Law, 2000  BYU  L.  REV.  1413,  1422  n.37
(TALMUD,  Shabbath 31a); Jack  L. Sammons,  Rank Strangers to Me, 18  U.  ARK.  LITTLE
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Howard Lesnick's recent book is a deep and wide meditation on relig-
ion in dialectic  with  law  over the  past thirty years.5  The  more  typical
legal scholarly treatment is a narrower enterprise.  It begins by noting
an apparent crisis in the legal profession or a decline  in ethics among
lawyers.  It then advises a search for virtue and goodness that religious
teachings,  beliefs,  and  institutions  can  assist."  Some  observers  have
noted that critics, since time immemorial,  have decried  the ethical cri-
sis  of  the  legal  profession,'  but  the  cries  became  louder  and  more
widespread after the Watergate scandals.  The thinness of professional
ethics, uninformed  by religion,  is another repeated theme."  Many en-
dorse  Sandy  Levinson's  critique  of  professionalization  as
"bleach [ing]"  out important aspects of the individual, such as religion
and ethnicity.9  Others join Stephen  Carter in criticizing  the trivializa-
RoCK  L.  REV.  1, 12  n.45  (1995)  (TALMUD,  Kiddushin 80b);  Douglas  W.  Kmiec,  Is  the
American Democracy  Compatible with  the Catholic Faith?, 41  AM.  J. JURIS.  69,  72  &  n.8
(1996)  (POPE  PIUS XI,  QUADRAGESIMO  ANNO  (1931)); Joseph  S.  Spoerl,  Making Laws
on Making Babies:  Ethics, Public Policy, and Reproductive Technology, 45 AM. J. JURIS.  93,
109 n.27  (2000)  (same); Jeremy Waldron, On the Road:  Good Samaritans and Compelling
Duties, 40 SANTA CLARA  L. REV.  1053,  1053-54  (2000)  (Luke 10:27-:37).
5  HOWARD  LESNICK,  LISTENING  FOR  GOD:  RELIGION  AND  MORAL  DISCERNMENT
(1998).
C See,  e.g.,  Daniel  0.  Conkle,  Professing Professionals:  Christian Pilots on  the River of
Law, 38 CATH.  LAW.  151,  164  (1998)  ("Christianity  may affect lawyers not only in how
they  generally understand or structure  their professional  life,  but also  in their day-to-
day manner of practice  ....  ); SamuelJ. Levine,  Introductory Note:  Symposium on Laryer-
ing and  Personal Values-Responding  to the Problems of Ethical Schizophrenia, 38 CATHiI.  LAW.
145,  148  (1998)  ("Religious  values,  in particular, have  gained increasing  prominence
in the arena of legal  ethics, as  they present  a comprehensive  system  of ethics  for law-
yers seeking to integrate their personal and professional  lives.").
7  Cf  Robert W. Gordon,  Law as a Vocation:  Holmes and the Lawryer's Path, in THE
PATH  OF THE  LAW AND  ITS  INFLUENCE:  THE  LEGACY  OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.
7,  7-9  (StevenJ. Burton  ed., 2000)  (articulating Holmes's  view that a lawyer who acts  as
"the mere  unthinking  instrument of clients'  passions  and partisan  ends"  is a  villain);
Robert  W.  Gordon,  Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age  of American Enterprise:
1870-1920, in  PROFESSIONS AND  PROFESSIONAL  IDEOLOGIES  IN AMERICA  70, 99  (Gerald
L.  Geison  ed.,  1983)  (noting  late-eighteenth-  and  early-nineteenth-century  speeches
calling for a return to civic  ideals in the legal  profession).
8  See,  e.g.,  MARY  ANN  GLENDON,  A  NATION  UNDER  LAvWYERS  78-79  (1994)
("[F]ormal  codes of ethics  never  aimed at  capturing  the  entire  ensemble  of under-
standings that lawyers observe  in their dealings ....  [W] here ethical  problems of great
complexity  are  concerned,  formal  canons  afford  little  guidance.");  ANTHONY  T.
KRONMAN,  THE  LOST  LAWYER  (1993)  (developing the importance  of practical  wisdom
as a necessary supplement  to traditional  legal training and methods).
9  E.g.,  Russell  G.  Pearce,  Learning  from the Unpleasant Truths of Interfaith Conversa-
tion:  William Stringfellow's Lessons for the  Jewish Lawyer,  38 CATH.  LAW.  255, 263  (1998)
(citing Levinson, infra note 75); Nancy B. Rapoport, Living "Top-Down" in a 'Bottom-Up"
World:  Musings on the Relationship Between Jewish Ethics and Legal Ethics, 78  NEB.  L.  REV.
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tion  of religion  in contemporary  life and  disdain  for  religion  in  the
academy.1 l
In medicine,  rising interest in spirituality  and the  role  of religion
in healing  has  produced  scholarship,  conferences,  training,  and  re-
search centers."  Fueled perhaps by patients'  concerns, this trend also
reflects  greater  interest in  spirituality  among younger  doctors. 2  Re-
specting  the  specific  religious  beliefs  of a diverse  patient group  has
become  a  vital  agenda  for  hospitals,  medical  schools,  and  nursing
training not only to  guard against discrimination  but also to enhance
the quality of care and results.  Religion, in short, is a very hot topic in
medical ethics today.
These  changes  in  the  legal  and  medical  professions  are  part  of
larger trends.  Whatever  your qualms about President Bush's  propos-
als  to increase government support for faith-based  initiatives,
3  candi-
date  Gore endorsed very similar  initiatives.  Both have  personal  con-
victions  leading  them  in  this  direction,  but  they  also  have
10STEPHEN  L.  CARTER,  THE  CULTURE  OF  DISBELIEF:  How AMERICAN  LAW  AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE  RELIGIOUS DEVOTION  (1993).
11  See,  e.g.,  Linda  L.  Barnes  et  al.,  Spirituality, Religion, and Pediatrics:  Intersecting
Worlds of Healing, 106  PEDIATRICS  899, 905  (2000)  ("The  changing  religious  and cul-
tural landscape of the United States makes  it imperative  that pediatricians understand
the role of diverse spiritual and religious issues  in the context of pediatric  practice.");
Anne  M.  Nordhaus-Bike,  A  Calling to  Care, HOSPITALS  &  HEALTH  NETWORKS,  Dec.
1998, at 22  (describing  the  medical  services  provided by parish  nurses  in Richmond,
Virginia);  Richard  P.  Sloan  et al.,  Religion, Spirituality and Medicine, 353  LANCET  664
(1999)  (evaluating various studies attempting to establish a connection between  physi-
cal health and religious  faith); Jan Ziegler, Spirituality  Returns to the Fold in Medical Prac-
tice, 90J.  NAT'L  CANCER INST.  1255,  1255  (1998)  ("Increasingly,  religion and spiritual-
ity  are  now  seen  as  factors  in  patient  relations  and  in  quality  of  life-attracting
increased attention in cancer research and practice.").
12 Ziegler, supra note 11,  at 1256.
13  See,  e.g.,  Zev Chafets,  W's Faith-Based  Funding:  An Idea Not  to Believe In, DAILY
NEWS  (New York),  Feb.  9,  2001,  at 49  (calling  Bush's plan  a "terrible and dangerous
idea"); Joseph  Chuman,  A  Return to  the 19th Century, RECORD  (Bergen  County,  N.J.),
Feb.  11,  2001,  at 3  (arguing that faith-based initiatives  compromise  "religious freedom
and government neutrality toward  the churches"); Albert Kovetz,  Bush's Plan Would Be
Divisive, PALM  BEACH  POST,  Feb.  11,  2001,  at 4E  (suggesting alternatives  to President
Bush's  proposed  funding  of  religious  chartiable  organizations);  Sue  Anne  Pressley,
Faith-Based Groups Under Fresh Scrutiny, WASH.  POST,  Feb.  11,  2001,  at A3  (noting  con-
cerns that federal  funding of faith-based social service  programs could violate the con-
stitutional separation of church  and state); Kenneth  Roe, Faith-Based Groups Need Safe-
guards,  DALLAS  MORNING  NEWS,  Feb. 10,  2001,  at 29A ("Mr.  Bush's proposal threatens
to roll back years of work on church-state separation  ....  ).
14 See Joan  Lowy,  Gore's Embrace of Charitable  Choice Stuns Civil Libertarians,  SCRIPPS
HOWARD  NEWS  SERVICE,  May  30,  1999,  at A13  (describing Vice  President Gore's sup-
port for charitable  choice  programs that would  allow government  aid  of religious so-
cial service organizations).
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sophisticated pollsters.  Their pollsters no doubt found trends similar
to  those  documented  most recently  in  a study entitled  For Goodness'
Sake:  Why So Many Want Religion to Play a Greater  Role in American Life.1 5
Produced  for the  nonprofit Public Agenda  group and funded  by  the
Pew Charitable Trusts, this study summarized findings from 1,507 half-
hour telephone  interviews of adults in  the  general  public  conducted
in November  2000, and a mail survey of religious  leaders, public offi-
cials, and journalists.  The study found  that a large  proportion of re-
spondents believe  that religion helps improve individual  behavior and
conduct.  Indeed, 69%  of respondents answered that "[m] ore  religion
is  the  best  way  to  strengthen  family  values  and  moral  behavior."'1 6
Eighty-five percent answered that parents would do a better job raising
their kids if more  Americans  were  to become  deeply  religious;  79%,
that  crime  would  decrease;  and  69%,  that  greed  and  materialism
would  decrease.
17  The  largest  majority-96%-agreed  that  "one of
the  greatest  things  about  this  country  is  that  people  can  practice
whatever religion they choose," and more than half (58%)  agreed that
belief in God is  not necessary  to be a moral person  or to  have  good
values.8  And 52%  of respondents worried that an increase  in intoler-
ance  toward  people  with  unconventional  lifestyles  would  increase  if
more people  became  deeply religious.'9  Only a majority  of Jews  and
nonreligious  people-when  examined  separately-opposed  prayer in
public  schools. °  In contrast, a large  majority of all those  sampled-
70%-favor  daily  prayer spoken  in  the  classroom,  and  56%  thought
school prayer is "one of the most effective  ways  to improve  the values
and  behavior  of young  people."'  And  again  it is 70%-perhaps  the
same 70%-who said that they want religion's influence in America to
22 grow.
Behind these survey results,  I suspect, are two short-term and one
longer-tenn  phenomenon.  First, it is no small matter, I think, that the
15  STEvE FARKAS ET AL.,  FOR GOODNESS'  SAKE:  WHY SO  MANY WANT  RELIGION  TO
PLAYA GREATER ROLE IN AMERICAN LIFE 7  (2001)  ("Americans often name loss of relig-
ion as a leading cause of intractable  social problems such  as drugs and crime."),  avail-
able at http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/religion/religion.htm  (last  visited  Oct.
31,  2001).
16  Id. at 11.
17 Id. at 12.
18 Id. at 13.
19 Id.
20  Id. at 17.
21  Id.
22  Id. at 44.666  UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA  LA W REVIEW
baby-boomers  are  getting  older.  As  boomers  age,  they-we-have
looked for ways  to  raise  children in  a violent  and commercial  world,
and also looked for meaning and support in dealing  with both mate-
rial success and personal challenges,  such  as illness and  the deaths of
friends  and family members.  Coincidentally,  boomers largely control
mass media, private institutions, and public debate.  This enables us to
project  our own  concerns  onto  the  public  stage  even  more  directly
than when we  tried to steer the political  and cultural  agenda through
activism in the '60s.
Second, in  the  recent decade,  wide  perceptions  of national  and
global problems have led many people of all generations into spiritual
and religious  searches.  Local  scandals  can  have  this effect.  Remem-
ber how President Clinton turned to ministers not only for forgiveness
but also for their public relations effect?  More profoundly,  drug and
alcohol  abuse,  related  crime,  and  the  persistent  poverty  of  many,
alongside the raging and at times conspicuous consumption  of others,
lead many  to  seek grounds  for critique  and reform.  Internationally,
inter-ethnic violence  and genocide, and  the international  versions of
widespread  suffering  alongside  remarkable  bounty,  generate  similar
searches  for  intellectual,  political,  and  moral  critique,  resulting  in
mobilization  and response.  After  the  terrorist attacks  of September
11,  churches,  synagogues,  and  mosques  became  filled  with  people
searching for reassurance, community, and belief.
But a deeper, longer trend across longer time spans is also vital to
this transition.  The past two centuries mark a period of secularization
followed  by recent expressions  of religious reaction.  After  the  relig-
ious wars  in Europe, political  thinkers such  as John Locke argued  for
separating church and state,  and political  actors such  as  Thomas Jef-
23 ferson  tried  to  institutionalize  such  ideas.  Yet  from  our  vantage
point, even such  people assumed far  greater scope  and influence  for
23 John Locke,  A Letter Concerning Toleration  (1689),  in 6 THE WORKS OFJOHN
LOCKE  47-48  (1812)  (arguing for a "law of toleration" under which  "no-body ought to
be compelled  in  matters of religion either by  law or force");  Letter  from Thomas Jef-
ferson  to  a Committee  of the  Danbury Baptist  Association  Uan.  1,  1802),  in 16 THE
WRITINGS  OF THOMAS JEFFERSON  281-82  (Andrew A.  Lipscomb  & Albert  Bergh  eds.,
1904)  (assuring the Danbury Baptists that the legislature  would not meddle  in  the af-
fairs  of the  church, and  using the  phrase  "separation  between  church  and state" for
the first time);  see  also Sanford Kessler,  Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Bill  for Establishing
Religious Freedom", 25 J.  CHURCH  &  ST.  231,  232  (1983)  (stating that Jefferson derived
principles of religious freedom  and separation  of church and state from John Locke);
J.  Clifford Wallace,  The Framers' Establishment Clause:  How High the Wall?, 2001  BYU  L.
REV.  755,  760-69  (describing  the  efforts  of Jefferson  and other  Founders  to  reduce
preference  toward religion through  enactment of the Establishment Clause).
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religion  as  a feature  of public  life  than  we  see in  today's  society.  If
separation  of church  and state  served  as  a  norm  at all  in  the  eight-
eenth and nineteenthth  centuries,  it applied  only  to the federal  gov-
24 emnment, not states or localities . Just taking  the academy  as  an ex-
ample,  the separation of religion from the study of philosophy did not
occur until the  twentieth  century; training clergy  remained a primary
purpose  of leading  institutions  of higher  education  throughout  the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  The debate over prayer in pub-
lic schools  often  turns  into contests  over  history, but no  responsible
historian  would  deny  that  publicly-funded  schools  throughout  the
nineteenth  and  early-twentieth  centuries  taught  the  Bible  and  pre-
sided  over prayers  without much  opposition
2 5-that  is,  without much
mainstream opposition,  for the integration of religion and public life
in  the  United  States  largely  meant  Protestantism.  The  common
school movement in particular confirmed  a Protestant culture.26
In contrast, Catholic leaders in the nineteenth  century saw public
schools as  failing  to  serve  their community;  as  the  century wore  on,
anti-Catholic movements pushed for compulsory school  laws in order
21 to block  the development of parochial,  Catholic  schools.  It  took a
Supreme  Court decision  that rejected compulsory  public schooling as
a violation  of parents'  abilities  to influence  their children's  upbring-
ing to put such  laws to rest.2 s  But during the same  period, Protestant
leaders inspired the social gospel movement that influenced the shape
of Progressive era reforms, including  the encouragement  of evangeli-
cal missions that at times conflicted  with the religious commitments  of
increasing waves  of Catholic and Jewish  immigrants. 29  Many of these
24  See JAMES  W.  FRASER,  BETWEEN  CHURCH  AND  STATE:  RELIGION  AND  PUBLIC
EDUCATION  IN A  MULTICULTURAL AMERICA  23  (1999)  ("Until  the  Civil War  the consti-
tutional  separation  of church  and  state  clearly  applied  only  to  the  federal  govern-
ment.").
25  Id. at 2-3, 46-47.
26  Id. at 43-47.
27  See  ROBERT  T.  HANDY,  UNDERMINED  ESTABLISHMENT:  CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS  IN AMERICA,  1880-1920, at 36-48 (1991)  (surveying the Catholic and Protes-
tant public education  strategies  of the late-nineteenth  century and discussing  the ef-
fects  of this clash on "the ways  in which  the relationship of religion  and government
was understood");  see also FRASER,  supra note  24, at 49-65  (describing  the  failed effort
to  get public  funds  for Catholic  schools and  the subsequent creation  of a  parochial
school system).
28 Pierce  v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S.  510,534-35 (1925).
29 HANDY,  supra note 27, at 145-57 (discussing the  diffiulties faced by rapidly grow-
ing Catholic  and Jewish communities attempting  to  reconcile  their  faiths with  the  re-
alities  of  nineteenth-  and  early-twentieth-century  public  education  in  the  United
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immigrant Jews  held  onto  Orthodox  practices,  surprising  both  well-
established  German  reform Jews  and other Americans.  The Catholic
leadership decided  to hold onto the ethnic and national traditions of
its new immigrants, and as  a result, structured parishes and imported
priests  to  reinforce  religious  and  ethnic  practices  rather  than  allow
them  to melt into America.  Struggles  between  these groups and  the
Protestant  majority  generated  political  battles  and federal  and  state
court decisions that increasingly challenged  the view of the country as
90 a Protestant nation.  Combined  with pragmatic  cooperation  among
religious groups during World War  I,  these  political  and legal  devel-
opments challenged the implicit hegemony of Protestantism.
31
Between  the  1920s  and  the  1980s,  the  emerging  public  solution
involved greater secularization.  This pattern  is  exhibited  partially  in
court decisions  during the period.
32  Courts approved school  instruc-
tion  about  evolution,s  recognized  nonreligious  conscientious  objec-
tion  to military service,"  rejected  instruction  in "creation science"  by
public  schools,"  prohibited  prayer in  public  schools, 6  and  legalized
abortion.3'  These decisions supported not only secularization but also
pluralism,  and stimulated intense  reactions  by religious  groups.  The
Christian  "religious right" rose, in part, in reaction  to these seculariz-
ing legal decisions.  Religious  academics, public intellectuals,  and law-
suits criticized  secular humanism as an established religion.0  And the
30  See H. Frank Way,  The Death of the Christian  Nation:  The Judiciay  and Church-State
Relations, 29J.  CHURCH  & ST.  509,  515-24  (1987)  (describing  legal challenges  to  Sab-
bath-closing  laws,  prayer-  and  Bible-reading  laws,  and  sectarian  school  funding  by
Catholic andJewish  litigants).
31  HANDY, supra note 27, at 189.
32  One  study  of religious-related  litigation  concluded  that federal  district  courts
"seem[ed]  very wary...  of offending any religious  denomination" and that their deci-
sions  were  basically  "pluralistic."  BARBARA  M.  YARNOLD,  RELIGIOUS  WARS  IN  THE
COURTS  II:  WHO  WERE  THE  LITIGANTS  IN  THE  U.S.  COURTS,  RELIGIOUS  FREEDOM
CASES  1970-1990, at 11,28  (2000).  The study also noted  "significant'judicial victories
for an "anti-religion" litigant.  Id. at 91-92.
4  Epperson  v. Arkansas,  393 U.S.  97  (1968);  see FRASER,  supra note  24, at  116-26
(discussing the famous  mid-1920s trial ofJohn Scopes and suggesting that even though
Scopes  avoided  punishment  under  a Tennessee  law that banned  teaching  evolution
due to  a technicality,  the cultural impact  of the case  was  to discredit religious  funda-
mentalism).
34  United States v.  Seeger, 380 U.S.  163  (1965).
"4  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
36 School Dist. v. Schempp,  374 U.S. 203 (1963).
37 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113 (1973).
'9  See Michael  W. McConnell,  The New Establishmentarianism,  75  Cuii.-KENT  L. REv.
453, 453  (2000)  ("Orthodoxies  come in secular as well  as religious  varieties.");  see also
CARTER,  supra note  10,  at  171-72  (discussing  how judges  have  characterized  secular
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general  commitment  to tolerance,  as well  as  the dominance  of a par-
ticular  Protestant  conception  of the  private  realm  as  the  proper  do-
main of religion, seemed to tell even devout people to treat religion as
a  once-a-week,  private activity-in  tension with  the view that  religion
affords a complete way of life.
Reacting  to  the long-term  trend of secularization,  many religious
people  have  engaged  in  "culture  wars"  over  values  in  the  United
States.  Leaders  of the  religious right interestingly  have  taken  advan-
tage of the emerging multicultural  framework.  That made respect for
diverse  identities  a  foundation  in  public  settings  and  labeled  the
treatment  of any group  different  from  others  to be  dicrimination-
enabling arguments for equality  and accommodation  for groups that
had been excluded  in the past.  An obvious  example  is  the Equal Ac-
cess movement, which convinced Congress and the Supreme Court to
ensure  to  religious  student groups  the  same  rights  to hold  meetings
and events accorded  to any student organization.
3
) This development
on the  one hand  seemed  a compromise  or middle  position between
those  who  would  ban  religion  from  public  places  and  those  who
humanism  as  a  religion  that therefore  cannot  be  favored  by  public  schools);  John
Whitehead  & John Conlan,  The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its
First  Amendment Implications, 10  TEX.  TECH.  L.  REv.  1, 30-31  (1979)  ("Secular  human-
ism  is  a  religion  whose  doctrine  worships  Man  as  the source  of all  knowledge  and
truth, whereas theism worships God as the source of all knowledge and truth.").  Some
litigants have challenged  particular public or employer educational  programs as viola-
tions of the  Establishment Clause  or  discriminatory  on  the  basis  of religion  because
they promote secular humanism rather than a theistic religion.  See Aguillard, 482 U.S.
at 592  (striking down  an  act sponsored  by  a state senator who  "repeatedly stated that
scientific  evidence  supporting his religious  [creationist]  views  should  be included  in
the public school curriculum  to redress the  fact that the theory of evolution  inciden-
tally coincided with what he characterized  as religious  beliefs antithetical to his own");
Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 688  (11th Cir. 1987)  (reversing the district
court's decision  that accepted  plaintiff's argument that "textbooks...  which  were  on
the Alabama State Approved Textbook List...  unconstitutionally  established the relig-
ion of secular humanism"); Taylor  v. Nat'l  Group of Cos., 729  F. Supp. 575,  577 (N.D.
Ohio  1989)  (rejecting  the plaintiffs  employment  discrimination  claim based  on  the
distribution  of a book to employees  that "plaintiff interpreted  to embrace  secular hu-
manism,  a  philosophy  allegedly  at  odds  with  her Christian  faith");  see  also Nadine
Strossen,  "Secular  Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism":  Proposed Standards  for Reviewing
Curricular  Decisions Affecting  Students'  Religious Freedom, 47  OHIO  ST.  L.J.  333,  338-54
(1986)  (discussing the lack ofjudicial consensus regarding secular humanism in public
schools).
39  See Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.  §§ 4071-4074  (1994)  (requiring public secondary
schools to provide  student groups equal access  to meeting space regardless of the con-
tent of the speech  that is  to occur at the meetings);  see also Bd.  of Educ.  v.  Mergens,
496  U.S.  226,  234  (1990)  (upholding the  Act against an  Establishment  Clause  chal-
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would  integrate  it  fully.  This  development  also  paralleled  political
theories, such  as Charles Taylor's, that characterize  the current com-
mitments to multicultural  tolerance  as  commitments  to recognition.4°
It is not at all clear whether it is a triumph for the religious  to use  the
secular framework  of pluralism  and  equality  to be  heard,  or a more
profound victory for the secular.
In either  case,  by the  1990s,  the  growing search  for religious val-
ues and  "God-talk" in many settings  reflected  both the  resurgence  of
an evangelical,  Christian religious right and the prevalence  of a toler-
ant, equal  respect  framework welcoming  to  all  kinds  of identity poli-
tics.  By this time, the relative comfort of members of religious minori-
ties  also  seems  pertinent.  Less  concerned  with  separating  religion
from other aspects  of life once  they had attained more economic and
political  security,  many  Catholics  and Jews joined  Protestants  in  dis-
playing and discussing  religion in political  and scholarly settings.  Al-
though Islamic and other groups have  been less visible in such activi-
ties, in some communities  members of these groups have also become
active in public celebrations and discussions.
Increasing  American  materialism  and  secularization  also
prompted  the revival  of religious reflection.  From the  1980s  onward,
members  of a variety of religious  faiths-and  people  from  both  the
right and left of the political spectrum-criticized  commercialism  and
greed.  Tipper Gore found support first among the religious right but
later  among secular left-leaning parents  in her campaign  for labeling
pop music.  It was not only conservative  religious figures but also post-
hippy  left-leaning  parents  who  began  to  condemn  the  commercial
glorification  of violence,  racism,  sexual  abuse,  and greed  in popular
culture. 4'  These left-leaning  parents  also forged  alliances  with clergy
and organized religious groups.  Religious groups have also developed
42 arguments for forgiving international debt by developing nations.
40  E.g., Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM  AND "THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION"  25, 63-73  (Amy Gutmann ed.,  1992).
41  For example,  they rallied against movies such as  WALL STREET  (Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox 1987),  which portrayed  a fictional corporate  raider who adhered  to the man-
tra, "Greed, for lack of a better word, is good."
42  See Samuel  E.  Goldman,  Comment, Mavericks in  the Market:  The Emergency Prob-
lem of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,  8 UCLAJ.  INT'L  L. & FOREIGN  AFF.  159,
163 n.9  (2000)  (describing Jubilee 2000/USA, part of a worldwide  movement of peo-
ple  and groups  seeking  to  cancel  the international debts  of the poorest countries  by
the new millennium, "inspired by the  Biblical concept of 'jubilee' found in  Leviticus  25:
every fifty years all debts were  to be canceled, land returned  to its original owners, and
the oppressed set free").
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It is against this complex backdrop that we should  understand the
growing interest in discussing  the religious identity and values of law-
43
yersjudges, doctors, and nurses.
Two kinds of persistent questions  emerge for professionals.  When
there  is  a conflict  between  religious  and  professional  norms,  which
should an individual professional follow, or are compromises  possible?
For it is not only religion that one may profess.  A profession  itself en-
compasses  beliefs,  practices,  and  commitments;  the  two  sources  can
conflict.  And in the absence  of such  a conflict, what are the benefits
and what are  the dangers-for  those  they serve  and for the larger so-
ciety-if professionals  rely on  their  religions  to guide  their conduct?
For both questions, analysis must prominently point to respect for the
client or patient, who  may  have different views  on religion.  But also
relevant are  the  norms and practices  that should govern  private  pro-
fessional institutions, such as law firms and hospitals.  And vital as well
are potential effects  on the larger civil society, if more emphasis on re-
ligion occupies professional  training and practice.  Lawyers  play a dis-
proportionate  role  in  this country's public life.  Health  care provided
by medical  doctors is salient to everyone's  quality of life.  The ground
rules  for  religion,  equality,  and freedom,  set  by law  for  private  and
public enterprises, may be reshaped if religion plays a different role in
professional  identity and practice than it has in the past.
Thus, there are three dimensions that matter.  First, there are the
effects  on the  professional-client  relationship.  Second,  there  are ef-
fects  on civil society.  Third, there  are consequences  for the  nation's
ground  rules.  On  each  dimension,  I find  (and I  confess,  I  feel)  am-
bivalence  about a growing  salience of religious identity  and practice.
After sketching such  ambivalence,  I will return  to the persistent ques-
tions for professionals and the search for paths through this thicket.
II.  AMBIVALENT  RESPONSES
One way to describe  the Constitution's use of two phrases govern-
ing state  and  religion  is  ambivalence.  The  guarantee  of individuals'
free  exercise  of religion  and  the  prohibition  of governmental  estab-
lishment of religion  seem  to express  simultaneous  attraction  toward
and repulsion from religion.  The apparent tension can be resolved by
emphasizing  the  Constitution's  concern  for  protecting  individual
43 On  the growing debate over the benefits  and dangers of religion in politics, see
Ruti Teitel,  A  Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78  CORNELL  L.  REV.  747
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freedoms  in  a  diverse  society.  When  individuals  are  involved  in  di-
verse,  mutually  inconsistent,  and  sometimes  antagonistic  religions,
government  will more readily guard individual freedoms by providing
an  across-the-board  commitment  not  to prefer  one  kind  of religion
over  others.  But the combination  of the Free Exercise and Establish-
ment  Clauses  also  expresses  a  simultaneous  respect  for  the  signifi-
cance  of religion  and  a  profound  worry  about what  happens  when
government supports religion.
The  historical  origins  and  continuing purposes  of the  Establish-
ment Clause  reflect concerns  about governmental  intrusions  into re-
ligion as much  as worries  about religion  moving into the governmen-
tal realm.  Both concerns argue against public preference  for any one
religion, or for religion over nonreligion, even as individuals'  religious
views  and practices  warrant deep  respect  and  protection.  And  both
concerns  caution  against  any  activities  that  would  lead  members  of
different religions to bring theological  and institutional  conflicts  into
the  public sphere, or invite  government to monitor or regulate  relig-
ious belief or practice.
The  ambivalence-or  high-wire  act-embodied  in  the  Constitu-
tion's  treatment  of religion  matches  my  personal  ambivalence.  As  a
student of ethnic and religious conflict in this country and around the
globe,  I  have  become  deeply worried  about  the incendiary  effects  of
governments  and  political actors  mobilizing  people  around  religious
differences  in places such  as Bosnia, Israel, and Northern Ireland.  As
a member of a religious minority group, I am reminded of the risk of
second-class  status,  exclusion,  and  worse.  Even  mild  expressions  of
majority  religious belief by governmental  officials  (such  as  President
Bush's  repeated mentioning of Jesus Christ in his Inaugural Address)
can have painful exclusionary  effects.  Yet I also admire very much the
many  individuals who draw upon religion in their lives and their pro-
fessions.  I have  great respect for  the commitments of groups such as
Catholic  Charities,  Lutheran  Social  Missions,  and  the Jewish Federa-
tion to serve people in great need.
More worrisome, to me, are religiously-inflected  arguments in the
political  realm,  yet  I  acknowledge  and  often  admire  the critical  and
prophetic  perspectives that religious groups contribute to democratic
debate.  Religious  teachings inspired leaders  of the  civil rights  move-
ment and the  antiwar  (as  in Vietnam War)  movement.  These move-
ments  generated  debates  and  policies  that much  improved  this  na-
tion.  I  learned  recently  that  Michael  Harrington's  book,  The  Other
America, which  kicked  off the  War on  Poverty,  was  itself inspired  by
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Dorothy  Day's  Catholic  Worker  movement. 4 4   My  colleague  Lucie
White  is  documenting  the  remarkable  influence  of  Black  women
church  leaders  on Head  Start legislation  and practices."  I  embrace
these  ready examples  because  I  agree  with  their  substantive  visions.
Although  I disagree  with  the pro-life  movement, and abhor violence
committed at times on its behalf, I respect the sincerity  of so many of
its advocates  and  the  underlying  project  to  advance  appreciation  of
and protection  for human  life  regardless  of utilitarian  claims.  I dis-
agree with the religiously inspired absolutism,  the particular elevation
of  early  embryos,  and  the  neglect  of  the  circumstances  that  drive
many women to seek  abortions.  But it is not the religious  impetus to
the  pro-life  effort  that is  troubling,  any  more  than  the  religious  di-
mensions  of  civil  rights,  anti-death  penalty,  and  antiwar  arguments
that I do find compelling. 4 6  Religious beliefs and practices, in each  in-
stance,  give people bases for criticizing  their circumstances  and work-
ing, by  their  own  light,  to improve  them.  Religion  thereby  offers  a
wellspring of moral and political  guidance  that can  critique  and also
replenish our society.  Its worth cannot be measured solely in terms of
each particular position  taken  by religious believers.  Thus, I  disagree
with John Rawls, who would test the contributions  of religious views to
political debate by asking how well  they advance  values recognized by
reasonable  liberal conceptions ofjustice, described as  the overlapping
consensus of varied comprehensive  views.47  The very vigor and critical
capacities  of political argument depend,  in my view, on the contribu-
tions  of diverse  people,  drawing  on  diverse  beliefs,  traditions,  and
points  of reference.  And  the  shape  of overlapping  consensus-the
very boundaries  of reasonable  liberal conceptions  of justice-do  and
44  See Acknowledgments for MICHAEL HARRINGTON,  THE OTHER AMERICA:  POVERTY
IN THE  UNITED  STATES (1962)  ("It was  through Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker
movement that I first came  into contact with the terrible  reality of involuntary poverty
and the magnificent ideal of voluntary poverty.").
45  Lucie E. White, Raced Histories, Mother  Friendships,  and the Power of Care:  Conversa-
tions with Women in Project  Head Start, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1569  (2001).
46  Stephen L.  Carter has offered particularly persuasive  arguments supporting the
role  of  religion  in  politics.  See  STEPHEN  L.  CARTER,  GOD'S  NAME  IN  VAIN:  THE
WRONGS  AND  RIGHTS  OF  RELIGION  IN  POLITICS  (2000)  ("Only  by  looking  at  politics
through the  lens of faith, rather than  faith through the lens of politics, will we  be able
to comprehend  the nature and resilience  (and the sensible  limits)  of the  involvement
of the overtly  religious organization and invididuals in our public life."); CARTER,  supra
note  10,  at 16  (contending that "democracy is best served when the religious  are  able
to  act  as  independent  moral  voices  interposed  between  the  citizen  and  the  state,
and...  our tendency  to wall  religion out of public  debate  makes  that role  a harder
one to play").
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must  change  over  time  as  people  criticize,  argue,  and  struggle with
one another, each informed  by life experiences  and multiple  sources
of values and beliefs.
I  do worry  about  the  risk  that some  may  seek  to  use  the  instru-
ments of government  to impose  their views on others  rather  than  to
work for a world  that can be held in common  .
4   And I also worry that
the notable increase in the religious content of political argument will
make  communication,  trust,  and  coalition  building  across  different
groups  more  difficult,  and unravel  our already  fraying  public  realm.
In the current climate of federal interest in supporting religious  solu-
tions  to the  problem  of poverty,  I  worry  about  competition  for gov-
ernmental resources  and public fights over what even is a religion.  Do
Scientologists count?  Wiccans?  Secular humanists?
Many of these  issues  may  seem  largely in  the  background,  how-
ever, when  religion  is joined  with  professional  identity and  practice.
Except  where  the  professional  fills  a  public  role-such  as  Attorney
General,  Surgeon  General  of the  United  States,  or Supreme  Court
Justice-the  professional  operates  as  a private  individual  whose  own
acts do not risk violating the Establishment Clause or the values it rep-
resents.  Thus,  as  a  theoretical  matter,  an  entirely  different  set  of
problems  arises  when  a judge quotes in an  opinion from  a  Christian
biblical  text 9 than when a private  attorney quotes the same  text while
advising a client.  The distinction  blurs, however, if the lawyer quotes
the same text in  a brief to a court.  Similarly, a physician  who runs,  or
works  at, a public  hospital  is  situated  differently  from  one who is  in
private practice.  Yet this distinction also blurs given the prevalence  of
public dollars in the systems for delivering and paying for health care.
Moreover,  the very distinction  between public and private is one that I
and  others  have  questioned  when  it comes  to application  of public
norms, such as  antidiscrimination.  Others challenge it from a differ-
ent direction  when  they object  to  how  privatized  and removed  from
public discourse  are expressions  of religious  faith.  So the distinction
between  state  and  non-state  action,  or  between  public  and  private
realms, does not resolve my ambivalence  about growing expressions  of
48 See CAROL WEISBROD,  THE  BOUNDARIES  OF  UTOPIA  (1980)  (examining the  liti-
gation  conducted between  American  utopian  communities and their former members
over  the enforcement  of membership  contracts);  see also Leslie  Griffin,  Good Catholics
Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S.  CAL.  INTERDISc.  L.J.  297 (1997)  (examining arguments
over the place of religion in political debate).
49 See, e.g.,  In re Guardianship of Phillip Becker, No. 101981  (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981)
(using the biblical  story of Solomon  to justify  the granting  of guardianship  in a child
custody dispute), reprinted in FAMILY  MATTERS  288, 298 n.9  (Martha Minow ed., 1993).
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religious views and practices by professionals.
Focusing specifically  on the  place of religion in the professional's
conceptions of role,  there is much to admire but also real grounds for
worry.  When religion shapes  the institutions where law and medicine
are  practiced,  people  who  share  my  ambivalence  have  grounds  for
cheering and for objecting.
Similarly,  there  is  much  to  commend  but  also  reason  to  worry
about the use of religious perspectives  to develop normative visions  to
animate law.  I am  saddened by descriptions of law as having nothing
to do  with justice  (even  as I acknowledge  that we  do call  these places
law schools,  not justice schools).  I  disagree  with  those  who  say  that
"[a]  lawyer's relationship  to justice and wisdom...  is on  a par with  a
piano tuner's relationship to a concert.  He neither composes  the mu-
sic,  nor  interprets  it-he  merely  keeps  the  machinery  running. '' 0
Lawyers-and  law-should  draw  upon  all  sources  of  wisdom  and
guides for pursuing justice, including religious ones.
But I find much to admire in John  Rawls's argument that such vi-
sions must be capable  of expression in secular terms, or what he calls
"public reason. ""  This means that reasons used in political discussion
must  be accessible  to the  comprehension,  scrutiny,  and  response  of
those  who do not share  the  speaker's  religious  convictions.
2   Other-
wise, the prospects  for open and reasoned debate diminish potentially
irreparably.  Speakers with some ostensibly secular views would also be
disciplined  by  this injunction.  Michael  Ignatieff has  written recently
of the danger that human rights activists,  in particular, may be devel-
oping a kind of religious attachment  to their arguments.  Their own
beliefs may seem to insulate them from rational  response.  Their tone
may carry the "triumphalism" associated with religious true believers, 4
and may be capable  of silencing competing views.  As a sometime hu-
man rights advocate myself, I am stung, usefully, by this critique.
Similar  problems  arise  with  professionals  who  claim  religious
authority for their positions  or actions.  Religiously  guided  critics  of
professionals  draw on traditions that others may not share.  I can wel-
50  LUCILLE  KALLEN,  INTRODUCING  C.B. GREENFIELD  (1979),  quoted in THE BEACON
BOOK OF QUOTATIONS  BY WOMEN  184  (Rosalie  Maggio  ed., 1992).
51 RAWLS,  supra note 47, at 212-54.
52 Id. at 224-25.
53  Michael  Ignatieff, Human Rights as Idolatry, in HUMAN  RIGHTS  AS POLITICS  AND
IDOLATRY 53, 53-55  (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001).
54  See  infra note  95  and  accompanying  text  (defining  triumphalism  and  recom-
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come  those  religious  views  as  sources  of critique  meant  to  inspire  a
generally  accessible  debate over ends, while objecting to  any effort to
install  the very  same  religious  views  as  official  policies.  An  example
here is scholarship  criticizing the work of individual judges for failing
to reflect the religious teachings associated with the judge's own  relig-
ious affiliation.  I have been especially struck  by Maria Failinger's  arti-
cle entitled,  The Justice Who Wouldn't Be Lutheran:  Toward Borrowing the
Wisdom  of  Faith  Traditions.  The  article  criticizes  Chief  Justice
Rehnquist's  strict constructionism  and  deference  to government  ac-
tors with  apparent inattention  to human hardship.5 6  Failinger further
argues that the ChiefJustice  fails  to recognize  the inevitability of con-
flicting  loyalties, loyalties  to intimate  relationships vis-a-vis  loyalties to
the  larger  community  and  state.  She  claims  the  teachings  of  the
Chief Justice's  own  religion-Lutheranism-would  push  the  balance
precisely  in  the  other direction,  toward  responding  to  human  hard-
ship and human need.  She asserts  that "the Lutheran  position would
construct a positive vision of the role of the judge, both in restraining
evil and in  providing  for  the nurture of the community.,"5  Failinger
warns against Senate confirmation  inquiries into ajudicial  candidate's
religious  beliefs.  Such inquiries would be unduly intrusive, and what-
ever they could discover would also offer poor predictions of ultimate
judicial  performance.  Yet  she  also  cautions  against  policies  that
force judges'  religions underground  because,  in her words, "perhaps
the  most  important source  of self-critique  for a judge  is  his  or her
faith."6)  I am not sure what Failinger has in mind.  But her comments
bring to my mind  the willingness  of even  religious  German judges  to
implement  the  Nazi  system,"'  South  African judges to  enforce Apart-
heid, and United States judges to enforce slavery.  In light of those ex-
amples,  I  would  agree  that  religious  and  other  sources  of  self-
critique-and  external critique-are  essential  to check judicial subor-
dination  to  unjust regimes.  Failinger's  own punchline  is  that a relig-
55  Failinger, supra note 2.
56  Id. at 674.
57 Id. at 691-93.
58  Id. at 676.
59 Id. at 702-03.
60 Id. at 704.
6' For a discussion ofjustice  in the Third Reich,  see  Matthew Lippman,  The  White
Rose:  Judges and  Justice in the Third Reich, 15 CONN.J.  INT'L L.  95  (2000);  and Richard
Posner,  Courting Evil, NEW REPUBLIC,  June  17,  1991,  at 36  (reviewing  INGO  MOLLER,
HITLER'S JUSTICE:  THE COURTS  OF  THE  THIRD  REICH  (Deborah  Lucas  Schneider
trans., 1991)).
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iously inspired  humility would better serve Chief Justice Rehnquist  in
62
working out his own commitment to respect democratic outcomes.
I enjoyed Failinger's  article and learned from it, although I worry
I like it mostly because it skewers ChiefJustice  Rehnquist in terms that
he might hear better than ones posed solely from my political point of
view.  I have the same response to criticisms ofJustice Scalia in light of
his Catholicism:
63  a guilty pleasure for one who worries about a vision
of courts  that urges judges  to  consult  their religious  traditions.  Of
course, as Justice Cardozo wrote eloquently,  any judge  consciously or
unconsciously  draws  upon the  entire  range  of experiences,  training,
and beliefs he or she has developed over a lifetime.6 4  But the question
is whether the judge should revel in all  these influences or instead  try
to  restrain  them  while  seeking  to  interpret  and  apply  secular  legal
guides.  The  critic  can  challenge  what  the judge  does  in  religious
terms;  the judge,  too, can  question judicial decision  making through
religious sources of critique.  Butjudicial answers must be guided  and
expressed  through  secular, legal  reasons.  Indeed,  if a judge's  relig-
ious  convictions  make  it impossible  for her to  enforce  the  law  as  a
secular  analysis  would  indicate, within  the  actual  span  for discretion
permitted  by the law, she should resign the post, not bend the post to
the religious  views."'  Similar analyses  can address  the qualifications of
jurors and grounds for excluding individuals from ajury.
Still, what's not to  like in  the vision  of Lutheranism  offered  to a
Chief Justice  by Failinger?  That vision does not conflict with  the task
of the  secular judge.  Instead,  it supports  a stance  for hearing  facts
and interpreting law  to do justice while respecting democratic  institu-
tions.  Yet not  all  interpretations  of Lutheranism  or  other  religions
point to  humility  before  democratic  outcomes  in  a pluralist  society.
Decision  making in  light of a judge's  religious tradition  may  be less
resistant to  the open  argument, critique,  and adversarial  debate  that
our system expects and demands.  Most troubling, religious references
62  Failinger, supra note 2, at 704.
63  See, e.g., Joseph  C.  Cascarelli,  The  Catholic's Role in the Legal Profession in Republi-
can  Government, 39  CATH.  LAW.  291,  292,  309-10  (2000)  (disagreeing  with  Justice
Scalia's contention  that judges are bound to apply only constitutional  and positive  law
and arguing in favor of the idea that "a Catholic  legal professional bears the obligation
of creating  and nourishing  an atmosphere  that  is receptive  to natural  law as a recog-
nized, legitimate body of law").
64  BENJAMIN  N. CARDOZO,  THE NATURE  OF THEJUDICIAL  PROCESS 113  (1921).
65  See  ROBERT  COVER,  JUSTICE  ACCUSED  (1975),  for  a  discussion  of  whether
antebellum judges who  disagreed  with  the  Fugitive  Slave  Laws  should  have  resigned
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and  guidance-however  well-motivated  and  however  universalistic  in
their outcome-risk signaling (or worse, implementing)  the exclusion
for some and inclusion for others that a democratic society committed
to freedom and equality must resist.
Moving from judges to  lawyers, elevating religion  as the conscious
guide  could  resolve  what  some  call  an  "ethical  schizophrenia"  pro-
duced by a professional  role conception.  That professional role seems
to require separation  from the individual's  beliefs and values.""  Tho-
mas  Shaffer's  landmark work,  On Being a Christian and a Lawyer, 7 of-
fers a powerful  and  admirable  cure-at least for those who share  his
views about ways  to bring conscience  and care  to law practice.  He re-
jects  a  professional  role  conception  that  requires  separation  from
one's  beliefs and  values.68  He  also  recasts  certain  professional  com-
mitments  to  render  them  more  compatible  with  Christian  ethics.6 !
Thus, he calls for revising the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client and
S 70 recasting it as  a duty of fidelity.  The duty of fidelity would  support
counseling  the  client  and  preserving  the  right  to  raise  moral  objec-
tions rather  than  serving  as  a  hired  gun,  doing  whatever  the  client
wants,  as the  duty of loyalty may imply.'  Shaffer  also argues that law-
yers  can  and  should  help  clients  search  for conciliation  and  recon-
ciliation rather than search for power. 7"
Informed by Christian  beliefs, this recommendation  etches a path
that would  help  many people  combine  their  religious and  moral  be-
liefs with the practice of law.  But if all lawyers followed  this search  for
conciliation,  instead  of  pressing  adversarial  interests  and  adverse
rights,  I  confess  I  would  worry.  I would  worry  about  so truncated  a
range of lawyering styles for a client who seeks to vindicate  a right, not
reconcile  with  an  opponent,  or  whose  sense  of violation  would  be
compounded,  not assisted,  by efforts  to seek  reconciliation.  I  would
worry about the lawyer who  is so  intent on conciliation  that he or she
does not explore with  the client all the litigation  options.  I would be
concerned  for  those  who  do  not share  the  lawyer's  religious  views.
66  See Levine,  supra note  6, at  146  ("In  response  to  the  dichotomy  between  per-
sonal  and  professional  values,  some  lawyers  attempt  to  develop  a  corresponding  di-
chotomy in their personalities...  (footnote omitted)).
67  SHAFFER,  supra note 3.
68  Id. at 32-33.
69  Id. at 89, 192.
70 Id. at 87.
71 Id. at 99.
72  Id. at 111,  132.
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And  I  would  be  concerned  for  an  adversary  system  predicated  on
competitive  fact-finding  and  argument.  The  system  will  not work  if
the lawyers  appearing in court curtail the arguments available  to them
in an effort to promote reconciliation between the opposing parties.
Some  others  have  argued  that Christian  lawyers  can  and  should
provide  religious  and moral  counsel.  Daniel  Conkle  notes  with  ap-
proval a lawyer's reference  to the Bible  to remind a client to make de-
cisions  based on the  client's sense of morality.4  But he  does caution
against an  aggressive  evangelism, in order to respect a  religiously  plI-
ral society and ensure effectiveness.
74  I  would add my hope that evan-
gelistic lawyers would give notice to clients ahead of time that religious
ministry  or counsel is part of their practice,  either to make it less em-
barrassing  and  less  expensive  for the  client who  does  not want  this
part of the relationship  to change  lawyers or to opt out of this portion
of the lawyer's services.  Such notice would  respect pluralism,  help the
lawyer who wants to be effective, and also restrain the use of the attor-
ney's power in consulting a vulnerable  client.
I  have  not  found  much  by  United  States  scholars  on  Islamic,
Hindu, or Buddhist lawyering,  although  I  am  still  looking.  There  is,
however, a growing literature on being a Jewish  lawyer.  I suppose it is
some source  of comfort for ambivalent people like me that this schol-
arship on Jewish  lawyering is too filled with disagreements  about what
being Jewish  offers  to  lawyering  to provide  much  of a threat  to  the
range  of approaches  to lawyering.  As  a Jew  familiar  with  how Jews
raise  arguments  about  everything  Jewish,  this  makes  me  chuckle.
Sandy Levinson's articles alone include at least five alternative concep-
tions joining Jewishness  and  lawyering,
r and other  scholars  add  still
more.
76  I  admire Seth  Kreimer's interpretation  of Jewish  tradition  as
73  See Conkle,  supra note 6,  at 167-69  (giving  an example of a lawyer who cites to
"relevant Scripture" when  advising Christian  personal  injury clients  to  return  to work
when  they are  physically capable of working, despite  the  potential  legal  advantages  of
remaining unemployed).
74 Id. at 180.
75  His proposed  five models are:  (a)  a Jewish  lawyer is someone who is both  a law-
yer and Jewish-but then the community  can  fight over who  is  a  lawyer;  (b)  a Jewish
lawyer expresses  social  and  political  solidarity  with  other Jews,  ethnicity  rather  than
commandments;  (c)  a Jewish  lawyer  takes  days  off of  work  to  observe  holidays  but
leaves the norms of practice  unchanged;  (d)  a Jewish  lawyer practices in Jewish courts;
and  (e)  a Jewish  lawyer  follows Jewish  law, limits scope of contact with  secular courts,
and elevatesJewish  law over secular  law.  Sanford Levinson,  Identfying theJewish Layrer"
Reflections on the Construction  of Professional  Identity, 14 CARDOZO L.  REV.  1577,  1583-1611
(1993).
76  See,  e.g.,  LESNICK,  supra note  5, at 158  (citing Seth  Kreimer's  view  thatJewish680  UNIVERSITY OF  PENNSYLVANIA  LA W REVIEW
urging  lawyers  to  support  those  who  are  disadvantaged."  This  is,
however, only  one of many readings  of what  the  tradition means  for
lawyering in America.  One that Sandy Levinson discusses  elevates  the
ethnic rather than  the religious  dimension and urges a kind  of inter-
est-group-politics approach  to lawyering.1
8
I am not sure what this means.  But I worry  about a use of ethnic
pride  in lawyering, whether  by Jews  or others, if this in any way  leads
to the appearance  or actual  practice of bias against members of other
groups  in the  way deals  are  negotiated  or suits are litigated.  Justice
Thurgood Marshall  used to tell of secret signals  used by lawyers  to ju-
rors,  reflecting their  shared membership  in all-white  Masonic  lodges.
Any direct or indirect signaling of membership and non-membership
could so jeopardize  the perception and fairness of the legal process; it
is another reason  to be scrupulous  in confining religion away from the
public corridors of law practice.  Signaling a private  language that op-
erates  by membership rather  than argument  threatens  even  the pre-
tense  of equality  and  transparency  that  allows  us  to  criticize  depar-
tures from those ideals.
The settings of private  law practice-law firms,  corporate  counsel
departments,  and public interest practices-can  be influenced  by the
religious  beliefs and affiliations  of their founders  and managers.  Mi-
chael  Kelly  describes  one  law  firm  whose  chief  clients  are  Roman
Catholic  institutions  and whose  common  purposes include  a spirit of
cooperation  and earned reputations  for public service,  quality lawyer-
ing, and effective service.'  It certainly looks like an appealing place-
even though  (or perhaps in part because?)  the attorney compensation
tradition  teaches  an  obligation  to  those  who  are not fortunate); Jos6  Faur,  Law and
Hermeneutics in Rabbinic  Jurisprudence: A  Maimonidean  Perspective, 14 CARDOZO  L.  REV.
1657  (1993)  (implying  that a Jewish  lawyer uses rabbinic  hermeneutics in interpreting
law);Jerome  Hornblass,  The Jewish Lawyer, 14 CARDOZO  L. REv.  1639,  1647  (1993)  (de-
scribing  the Jewish  lawyer as one who defends Jewish  interests and "manifests  the holi-
ness  of being Jewish in  his or  her daily  life");  Russell  G.  Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a
Multicultural  Society:  A Midrash on Levinson, 14  CARDozo  L. REv.  1613,  1621-22  (1993)
(citing Jack Greenberg  as an example of a lawyer whose Jewishness led him  to identify
with the struggle of African Americans for equality and justice).
77  Seth Kreimer, The  Responsibilities  of the Jewish  Lawyer 3  (1993)  (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author),  quoted in LESNICK,  supra note 5,  at 158.
78  Levinson,  supra note  75,  at  1590-94  (categorizing  Jewish  lawyers,  such  as Alan
Dershowitz,  who "feel a high  degree of membership  in, and presumably a loyalty to, a
specifically Jewish  community,  regardless  of whether  there  is  an  explicitly  religious
element to this identification").
79 MICHAEL  J.  KELLY,  LIVES  OF  LAWYERS:  JOURNEYS  IN  THE  ORGANIZATIONS  OF
PRACTICE 53, 78-83  (1994).
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is  notably  lower than  at  comparable  firms." s  Kelly  does  not discuss
how that firm-given a fictional name  in his book-hires, or whether
it seeks  or discourages  non-Catholic  lawyers  and staff, and I  have  no
reason to believe that it discriminates.  Surely, if a given religious insti-
tution  believed it needed  to employ exclusively  lawyers  affiliated with
its tradition, it could hire such  lawyers, and even  build an internal law
practice."'  Yet,  historical  practices  of religious  exclusion,  informally
replaced  by religious "clubbiness"  at other law firms,  make me worry.
This  is why  Title VII antidiscrimination  norms do-and should-apply • 82
to  law firms above  the  minimum  size.  Because  sites of law practices
are work settings like any other, the commitment to creating a society
open to all should be carried out there; because law is so tied to public
norms  and  institutions,  fulfilling  this  commitment  is,  if  anything,
greater  for  law  practice  settings.  This includes  accommodating  the
individual lawyer's religious beliefs.
Such accommodations  would include permitting  the lawyer to ob-
serve  religious  holidays,  hours  of  prayer,  dietary  restrictions,  and
clothing  requirements.  Reasonable  accommodations  should  also  al-
low a lawyer to refuse  to work for a particular client or cause when his
objection grows from religious or sincerely held conscience grounds.
Similarly, neither courts nor the bar should refuse  to accommodate  a
lawyer's religious beliefs or conscience  when a court seeks  to appoint
a lawyer to represent a client.
Thus, I  think that the Board  of Professional  Responsibility  of the
Tennessee  Supreme  Court  wrongly concluded that a Catholic  lawyer
could  not  decline  to  represent  a  minor  seeking  an  abortion  even
though  the lawyer claimed  that such representation  violated  his relig-
so  Id. at 75-76.
81  Such discrimination on  the basis of religion in employment is permitted.  See 42
U.S.C. §  2000e-1  (1994)  (exempting  religious institutions from certain  prohibitions on
employment discrimination);  see also Corp. of the Presiding  Bishop  of the Church  of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327  (1987)  (upholding the Tite VII
exemption for discrimination by religious institutions).
See 42  U.S.C.  §  2000e(b)  (1994)  (defining "employer" to include  firms with  fif-
teen or more employees);  see also EEOC v.  Rinella  & Rinella,  401  F. Supp.  175,  179-81
(N.D. Ill.  1975)  (concluding that associates of a small firm count as employees,  in addi-
tion  to  the secretaries  and  clerks,  for  the  purposes  of determining  whether  an  em-
ployer is subject to Title VII).
8  Cf United States  v. Seeger,  380 U.S.  163,  176  (1965)  (holding that a conscien-
tious objector  needs to have a "sincere and meaningful belief" that plays the  same role
in her life that a similar belief plays in the lives of those who  have already qualified  for
the exemption).  There, as with  Title VII,  the question  is  how to construe  a statutory
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ious beliefs. 4  Indeed,  this might even  be an instance  of wrongful  ef-
forts  to establish  secularism and  surely to constrain  the free  exercise
of an individual's  religion.  The  duty to ensure  representation  under
the Sixth Amendment for indigent criminal defendants and the more
general  duty to represent unpopular  clients  does not and should not
oblige  individual  lawyers  to represent  any particular  client, especially
in  the  absence  of demonstration  that no one  else  will  do  so. 8 5  If it
truly  came  to  pass  that no one could  be found  to represent  an indi-
vidual  but  the lawyer who has  a religious objection,  then my  ambiva-
lence would surface,  but I think we can wait for such  a moment to re-
solve  the  matter.  Even  where  the  lawyer-out  of  conscience  or
religious belief-would  object to representing the pregnant minor cli-
ent who seeks an abortion, professional  duty should be understood  to
require the lawyer, consulted by that individual,  to disclose  the option
of going t 9 court or else to refer her to someone  who would  offer that
kind of representation.
Some  related  issues  arise  in  health  care.  Should  an  individual
physician  be  able  to  refuse  to  provide  a  particular  medical  treat-
ment-contraception,  abortion,  end-of-life  pain  medication-that
might shorten  life?  The  Catholic Church's  teachings  are explicit on
this  subject,  and  a believing  Catholic  physician  has  a real  dilemma,
pitting  client  care  against  the  professional's  religious  belief. 8"  So
would many OrthodoxJews.
Some  Catholic  physicians  and nurses address  the problem  by giv-
84 Bd.  of  Prof'l  Responsibility  of the  Sup.  Ct.  of Tenn.,  Formal  Op.  96-F-140
(1996).  For a  thorough discussion  of the issue,  see Teresa Stanton  Collett, Professional
Versus Moral Duty:  Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 WAKE  FOREST  L. REV.
635  (1997),  ultimately arguing that a lawyer should be  able to  refuse  a case on moral
or  ethical  grounds.  The  Code of Professional  Responsibility urges  lawyers to  accept
appointments  absent  "compelling  reasons,"  MODEL  CODE  OF  PROF'L  RESPONSIBILITY
EC  2-29  (1980),  and the  Model Rules of Professional  Conduct announce a duty to ac-
cept court appointments absent "good cause,"  MODEL RULES  OF  PROF'L CONDUCT  R.
6.2  (2000).  Religious reasons should count under both exceptions.
85 A  particular law job may involve so  much work that an individual may object on
religious or conscientious grounds  that she  simply cannot do  the job as  explained by
the employer.  Presumably, a lawyer who  establishes sufficient reasons to  refrain from
one appointment would retain  the duty to accept other appointments that do not trig-
ger the same objections.
86 Other  issues  can  arise.  For  example, should  an  individual  physician  seek  to
promote  fetal survival  even  at  the  cost of overriding  a  pregnant mother's  refusal  to
have  a cesarean section?  See Kelly F. Bates, Note,  Cesarean  Section Epidemic: Defining the
Problem-Approaching  Solutions, 4  B.U.  PUB.  INT.  L.J.  389,  399  (1995)  (noting that doc-
tors  who oppose  abortion on  moral  or religious grounds  might override such  refusal
based on  the view  that a  woman's refusal to undergo a cesarean  birth is "cruel or igno-
rant").
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ing  patients  referrals,  if they  want  them,  for  the  services  that  the
health care professional will not provide.  This may inconvenience  but
still  serve  the patients;  for many individual  physicians  and nurses, re-
ferrals represent an uncomfortable  compromise.  But the physician  or
nurse who refuses  to give  referrals or even disclose the options  to the
patient,  in  my  view,  disserves  the  patient,  often  severely.  Professor
Sylvia  Law has effectively  argued  that the First Amendment  does not
protect a physician from an  obligation  to  refer  a patient for services
the physician  does not want to perform. 8 7  As states explore physician-
assisted suicide,  a wider group of health care  professionals will experi-
ence  conflicts  between  their  religious  convictions  and  the  duty  to
serve patients.  If this kind of tension  drives away thoughtful, religious
people from sectors of the health care professions,  I worry that the net
effect is a negative one not only for them but for the society.
Even  more  difficult  issues  arise  at  the  level  of the  institutional
practice.  Secular  and  religious but  non-Catholic  health  care  institu-
tions,  such  as  large  hospitals  and  health  care  centers,  can  provide
more latitude  for  the individual  Catholic health  care  provider.  As  a
result, the individual physician  or nurse may be able to avoid perform-
ing  procedures  that  offend  his  or  her  religious  beliefs.  They  still
should not be able to avoid making referrals, however.88  If the health
care provider is a Catholic institution, an entirely different set of issues
may arise.  The  Church's leaders  have  interpreted  Church  teachings
to prohibit provision  of abortions, and as private  institutions, such fa-
cilities should  have  the ability  to control  their operations in line with
their missions  and  commitments.  If they have  public  contracts  and
funding, though, there  really is a dilemma.  The government could set
conditions on the use of the public  money (although  the courts have
not  been  willing  to  impose  any),  but  the  Catholic  institutions  may
then  simply  refuse  the  public dollars-and  become  even  less  able  to
fulfill  their mission  to serve  the poor and needy, a mission which  ob-
viously helps the broader society as well.
In  the  meantime,  the  number  of mergers  between  Catholic  and
non-Catholic  hospitals  is rising sharply.  In about half of the mergers
87  Sylvia  A.  Law,  Silent No More:  Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to Patients
Seeking Abortions, 21  N.Y.U.  REv.  L. & SOC.  CHANGE 279, 302  (1995).
Such  accommodations  may  flow  from Title  VII  or state  religious  freedom  ref-
ormation  acts (RFRAs)-should  they remain constitutional.  See Eugene Volokh,  Inter-
mediate Questions of Religious Exemptions, 21  CARDOZO  L. REV.  595, 643-45  (1999)  (argu-
ing that a wide range of government workers  might be able to refuse to fulfill  some job
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over  the  past decade,  all  or some  reproductive  health  services  previ-
89
ously provided by the non-Catholic institution  have been eliminated  .
State attorneys general, entrusted with the responsibility of approving
such  mergers, typically treat the approval process solely as a matter of
antitrust  and assessment  of need.  In  addition to  those criteria,  they
could  consider  the  impact  of  the  mergers  on  the  constitutionally-
protected  right  for  individuals  to  make  their  own  reproductive
choices.  But they usually do not, due  to the multiple  considerations
involved  in a merger, complex political  contexts, and concerns  about
preserving medical services in rural and urban areas.
I hope that the availability of reproductive  services  can become  a
factor in decision making by attorneys general or elsewhere that other
governance  structures  can  become  involved.  For  the  pluralism  that
protects the choices  of the  Catholic institutions  must also protect the
choices  of patients whose  rights include  pursuing treatment that the
Catholic institutions  do not provide.  This is  the challenge of preserv-
ing the  overarching  framework  within which  pluralism  can  work  for
all people!"
Religion  often  does not conflict with  a professional  role,  but  in-
stead strengthens individuals  who act as professionals.  One physician
explained  to me that religion is central  to his  conception of his work,
and offered as an example the fact that the first question he asks resi-
dents during rounds is the patient's  name and that he will not review
the patient's status without knowing that name  (and making sure  that
the  resident knows  the  name).92  For  this doctor, learning  the name
helps to see  the patient as a whole person, and to remember that it is
a  privilege  to  serve  the  person  in  need.  These  perspectives,  in  his
89  Nadine  Strossen & Ronald  K.L. Collins,  The Future of an Illusion:  Reconstituting
Planned Parenthood v.  Casey, 16  CONST. COMMENT. 587, 590 (1999).
90 For a thoughtful  discussion, see  Lisa  Ikemoto,  When  a Hospital  Becomes Catholic,
47  MERCER L.  REV.  1087,  1132-34  (1996).  Some Catholic hospitals have  developed  al-
liances rather than  mergers, and in  some of these instances, there  have been  arrange-
ments  preserving  the  reproductive  services  in portions  of the combined  system.  Yet
this can  be viewed  as the institutional  counterpart  to  the uncomfortable  compromise
made by individual  Catholic physicians,  and the Catholic  leadership can disapprove  of
such arrangements.
9  Similarly,  medical  schools  should  train  physicians  how  to  perform  abortions,
regardless of the physician's plans  to ever do them.  See Douglas Laycock,  Summary and
Synthesis:  The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV.  841,  851  (1992)  (noting
that a Catholic  hospital's residency program  lost its accreditation  in obstetrics  and gy-
necology after it refused to teach doctors how to perform abortions).
92  Interview  with  Dr.  Robert  Singer,  Family  Practitioner,  Massachusetts  General
Hospital, in Newton, Mass.  (Dec.  27, 2000).
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view,  are framed  by  his  religious  understandings.  Conflict  between
such  views  and  professional  role  could  arise,  however,  in  the  ever-
increasing  pressures  to  reduce  "expensive"  physician  time  with  pa-
tients  in  the regimes  of managed  care.  Religiously  motivated  health
care providers are likely to encounter increasing conflicts with the ex-
pectations  and rules  of health  care  organizations  where  curtailments
in attention and services are mandated.
This reminds me of the emerging debates over government fund-
ing for  religious organizations  to provide social  services.  Most of the
controversy  on  this  subject  centers  on  the  potential  risk  of govern-
ment appearing  to establish  religion, or else on the compromises-if
any-that  the  religious  organizations  must  make  to  receive  govern-
ment funding.  Yet the more profound danger  may come  if religious
groups are  restrained from critiquing  governmental  policies,  such  as
cutbacks in welfare and human services.  Similarly, preoccupation with
the borders between religious practice  and institutional rules, however
fascinating,  may distract us from  the larger policy issues about access
to health  care and legal services,  where  the participation  of religious
groups can play a vital role.
III.  GUIDES FOR THE AMBIVALENT
Ah,  time  grows near for a conclusion.  I  feel  a little  bit like Vita
Sackville-West, who once commented,  "I have come to the conclusion,
after many years  of sometimes  sad experience,  that you cannot come
to any conclusion at all."
93
Yet  even  with  my  ambivalence,  I  have  been  hinting  at  my  own
conclusions  about how  professionals  should  respond  to conflicts  be-
tween  their professional  role and religious commitments.  I have sug-
gested  that where  there  are conflicts  between  the professional's  role
and deeply held religious  beliefs,  the  individual should  seek a way to
meet  the  needs  of the  client  or  patient-through  referrals  if neces-
sary-or to shift away from work in  the field of conflict, or else  resign
the  professional  role.  The  professional  norms may  be thin  in some
respects, but here they are thick.  Failure to educate  a patient or client
about her options as they exist under prevailing standards of practice
breaches these professional norms.
I have also  suggested that where  there  are conflicts between  a re-
ligiously  governed  practice  setting  for  professionals  and  rights  en-
93VITA  SACKVILLE-WEST,  IN YOUR  GARDEN  AGAIN  (1953),  quoted  in THE  BEACON
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sured by the secular state to patients and clients, responsibility shifts to
those who govern  the mix of institutions  to ensure  that patients'  and
clients'  rights  can be met.  And I have indicated  the vital  role that re-
ligious belief and practice can play in both inspiring individual profes-
sionals to do their hard daily work  and inspiring persistent but exter-
nal critiques of the professional practices and institutions.
Where  there  is no obvious conflict between professional  duty and
religious  commitment, it would seem  that an individual could pursue
the religious guidance fully.  Yet here, I expressed caution about trun-
cating  the  range  of professional  services  and  strategies.  And  I  ex-
pressed  my worries about signaling bias and exclusion  toward any but
co-religionists  if a  professional  makes  religious  language  and  values
dominant in the professional practice.  The religiously guided profes-
sional  should  also  disclose  his  or her reliance  on  religious  values  to
avoid misleading the client and to ensure acknowledgment  of alterna-
tive approaches.
Along the way, I have considered but found inadequate  a range of
guideposts to mark where religion should run unfettered and where it
should  be  restrained.  The  distinction  between  public  practice  and
private  practice,  at first appealing, simply fades in our world of inter-
mingled  public  and  private  activities,  funds,  and institutions.  I  con-
sidered drawing  the line between  the personal,  individual action  and
the  institutional  design for  professional  practice,  but this too cannot
mark  the  places  for  religious  guidance  from  those  where  religion
should stay out.  I do find much to recommend John Rawls's view that
religion can offer springboards  for action but notjustifications in pub-
lic life.'4  Otherwise, the prospects  for communication  across different
groups  grow very dim, and the occasions  for using religious  authority
as  a club-of both the weapon  and social  variety-jeopardizes  equal-
ity,  participation, and mutual  exchange.  But Rawls's  own recommen-
dation  is  complex  and difficult  to  clarify.  If acceptable justifications
are  those  found  in  an  overlapping  consensus-marking  the  conver-
gence  between  comprehensive  views,  like  religions  and ideologies-
then  separating  springboards  and  justifications  can  be  a  sticky
business.  It  is  also  likely  as  much  a  function  of a  given  historical
movement  as  anything  else  whether  a  particular  argument  appears
accessible  to people who hold a different comprehensive  view.
I  am humbled  by  the difficulty  of sharply concluding  what place
religion should  have in the lives of professionals  in a pluralist society.
94  RAWLS,  supra note 47, at 224-25.
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Humility  is  itself, of course, often  a deeply  religious  notion.  But, so
often,  its opposite  seems  to come  with  the  territory of religious prac-
tice and identity.  Did you hear about the two Christian  ministers who
concluded  an ecumenical  conference where  they had shared respect-
ful discussions of their denominational  differences?  One grasped  the
hand of his new friend, and reported, "I now see that we both worship
God; you in your way, and me in His."
And then there is the classic story about the rabbi, cantor  (singer),
and  shammas  (custodian)  who  were  in  the  sanctuary  preparing  the
synagogue for Yom Kippur, the highest holiday of the year.  Suddenly,
overcome  with religious fervor, the rabbi  throws himself down  on the
ground before  the Ark, containing the Torah, and  says,  "Before you,
Almighty  One,  I  am  nothing, I  am  less  than  a speck  of dust,  please
bless me, please forgive me."  Seeing the rabbi on the floor, the cantor
throws  himself down  on  the  floor  and  says,  "Before  you,  Almighty
God, I am nothing, I am less than a squeak of the door, I am nothing,
please bless me, forgive me."  The shammas is mopping up in the back
of the  room.  Seeing  the  rabbi  on  the  floor  and the  cantor  on  the
floor, he  throws  himself down  on the  ground  too, saying,  "Almighty
God, I am nothing, I am nothing, I am nothing."  At which point, the
cantor nudges the rabbi, points to the shammas, and says,  "Look who
thinks he's nothing!"
Pride or smugness, even  in the guise of humility, is unfortunately
a familiar  feature or impression  associated with  religiosity.  Some de-
vout  people  I know  deliberately  keep  their religiosity  private  for fear
of implying a  "holier than  thou" attitude.  That  kind  of restraint  is
admirable, but the resulting divisions of the self are unfortunate.  The
individual may feel torn and unable to integrate two sets of beliefs; the
profession  may  be  deprived  of enriching  sources  of values  and  cri-
tique;  clients  and the  broader  society  may  be short-changed  as  well.
Yet professionals  who live  and work in  a multireligious  and multicul-
tural society must  also comport with  secular  values and  ensure equal
respect for clients and patients, whatever their affiliations.  So should
the institutions set up to deliver  professional services.  I  think this en-
tails  avoiding  what Howard  Lesnick  calls  "triumphalism"  or even  its
appearance:  The secular professions  of law and medicine  need the
humility  and  the  questions  that religious  sources  and  concerns  can
sustain.  But  resisting  the  implication  that your religious  convictions
95 See LESNICK,  supra note 5, at 53-65 (describing "triumphalism"  as the manner in
which "many who profess a belief, especially a religious belief, in the existence of truth
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give  all  the  answers-for  you  and  for  those  you  serve-may  be  the
most critical challenge  for those who  would  overtly combine  religion
and professional identity.